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Abstract 
 
Collaboration leads us to judge our own ability to be more similar to our collaborator 
and their ability to be more similar to our own, while competition leads us to 
exaggerate the gap between our abilities. How does this happen and what does it 
mean? 
 
 
	
 	
As a social species, humans are continually tracking the states of our conspecifics. 
We monitor states of knowledge, emotion, and physical condition in order to better 
predict and control our interactions with others, and in order to learn about our 
physical and social environment. Representation of others also allows information to 
be garnered about the self; knowledge of my previous attempts to run 100 metres 
enables me to predict how long it will take the next time I do so, but doesn’t enable 
me to answer the question “Am I fast?”; only comparison with others allows us to 
answer such relational questions. 
 
Representation of others introduces a requirement to keep self- and other-related 
representations distinct. For example, if I am preparing to return your tennis serve I 
need to form as complete a representation of your action as possible in order to 
predict the flight of the ball, but keep the representation of your action distinct from 
representation of my motor plan to return the ball [1]. A similar ‘self-other distinction’ 
is necessary when attempting to adopt the perspective of another, or to represent 
their emotions or attitudes, especially when they are in conflict with one’s own [1]. 
Interestingly, the degree to which a self-other distinction is maintained can be 
impacted by task demands and social factors. Although we tend to imitate individuals 
from our in-group more than from out-groups (a result of blurring the distinction 
between self and other for in-group members), this tendency can be nullified, or even 
reversed, when our aim is to engender cooperation with out-group members and to 
compete with in-group members [2]. 
 
A recent paper made important contributions to our understanding of self-other 
distinction by demonstrating that judgements of our own ability can be influenced by 
our judgements of the ability of others, and that this influence is modulated by the 
context within which such judgements occur. Wittmann and colleagues [3] 
demonstrated that, when asked to judge their own performance on a task, 
participants’ judgments were influenced by their judgments of others in a context 
dependent fashion. Specifically, when participants chose to collaborate with another 
individual, they judged their ability to be more similar to that of the other, yet when 
they decided to compete with the other, they judged their ability to be further from 
that of the other. Judgments concerning the ability of the other were also influenced 
by judgement of the self in a complementary fashion. This finding is reminiscent of 
previous findings within social psychology that cooperative attitudes promote 
attention to similarities between group members whereas competitive attitudes 
promote attention to differences between group members [4], but extends these 
findings to demonstrate that cooperation vs competition can influence judgements 
themselves, not just whether those judgments are attended to.  
 
Wittman and colleagues [3] used fMRI to identify neural correlates of their 
behavioural effect. A model-based analysis revealed that representation of one’s 
own ability was associated with activity in perigenual Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 
whereas activity in dorsomedial frontal area 9 tracked the other’s ability, and also 
likely integrated self- and other-related information according to context. It is likely 
that the temporoparietal junction is then involved in selecting whether self or other is 
attended to [5,6]. Although these results point to a potential neural mechanism by 
which representations of the self and other may interact, the psychological 
mechanisms are less well understood. While not the focus of the paper, the authors 
did note that their results are consistent with the ‘anchoring’ effect [7], whereby 
individuals produce biased estimates of uncertain values because they base or 
‘anchor’ their estimates on an initial value. For example, imagine that two groups are 
presented with a new piece of technology and asked to estimate its value. If one 
group is told that the technology had been reduced from £100 and the other that it 
had been previously reduced to £50, then the former group is likely to assign it a 
higher value. The suggested explanation is that the values assigned by the groups 
are anchored by the values of £100 and £50, respectively, and that participants tend 
not to move too far from these values. When judging their own ability and that of the 
other, participants in Wittmann and colleagues’ experiment may focus on the 
difference between abilities when asked to compete and on the average of their 
abilities when asked to collaborate; the difference between these values biases their 
estimates of their own ability and that of the other according to context.  
 
The anchoring explanation raises important questions about the domain-generality of 
effects such as those observed by Wittmann and colleagues. Future studies may 
build on their findings by investigating whether comparable effects are observed if 
participants are asked to estimate the performance of an algorithm or robot instead 
of another human. A non-social control condition [6,8] such as this would clarify the 
extent to which such effects can be described as social in nature and identify 
whether they reflect the degree of distinction between self and other representations 
specifically, or whether they might be obtained via the same mechanism that 
produces anchoring effects in non-social contexts. This question is not merely of 
academic interest; failures of self-other distinction and selective representation of 
self or others are thought to characterise some clinical groups such as those with 
autism [9], while studies suggest self-other processing is likely still developing into 
adulthood [10]. If judgements of our own ability also fit into the same framework, then 
this may underlie the difficulties with interpersonal coordination during joint tasks 
experienced by some clinical populations, and the atypical risk behaviour exhibited 
by adolescents, particularly in social situations. The latter possibility is consistent 
with the high accident rate among teenage drivers when with their peers – teens may 
overestimate their degree of control at high speeds and put themselves in danger. It 
is therefore interesting that the ability to selectively represent self and other can be 
modulated by brain stimulation, providing the potential for intervention should this 
prove necessary [5]. 
 
  
References 
 
[1] de Guzman, M., Bird, G., Banissy, M. J., & Catmur, C. (2016). Self–other control 
processes in social cognition: from imitation to empathy. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B, (1686), 20150079. 
 
[2]	LaFrance, M. (1985). Postural mirroring and intergroup relations. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 11(2), 207-217. 
 
[3]	Wittmann, M. K., Kolling, N., Faber, N. S., Scholl, J., Nelissen, N., & Rushworth, 
M. F. (2016). Self-other mergence in the frontal cortex during cooperation and 
competition. Neuron, 91(2), 482-493. 
 
[4] Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., & Bachman, B. A. (1996). Revisiting the contact 
hypothesis: The induction of a common ingroup identity. International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations, 20(3), 271-290. 
 
[5] Santiesteban, I., Banissy, M. J., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2012). Enhancing social 
ability by stimulating right temporoparietal junction. Current Biology, 22(23), 2274-
2277. 
 
[6] Sowden, S., & Catmur, C. (2015). The role of the right temporoparietal junction in 
the control of imitation. Cerebral Cortex, 25(4), 1107-1113. 
 
[7]	Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Heuristics and biases: Judgement under 
uncertainty. Science, 185, 1124-1130. 
 
[8] Garvert, M. M., Moutoussis, M., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Behrens, T. E., & Dolan, R. J. 
(2015). Learning-induced plasticity in medial prefrontal cortex predicts preference 
malleability. Neuron, 85(2), 418-428. 
 
[9] Spengler, S., Bird, G., & Brass, M. (2010). Hyperimitation of actions is related to 
reduced understanding of others' minds in autism spectrum conditions. Biological 
psychiatry, 68(12), 1148-1155. 
 
[10] Cook, J., & Bird, G. (2011). Social attitudes differentially modulate imitation in 
adolescents and adults. Experimental brain research, 211(3-4), 601-612. 
 
 
